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1 Problem statement
Consider a game with m ≥ 2 players indexed by i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. The strategy xi of the ith
player lies in a real Hilbert space Hi and the problem is to find x1 ∈ H1, . . . , xm ∈ Hm such that
(∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}) xi ∈ Argmin
x∈Hi
f(x1, . . . , xi−1, x, xi+1, . . . , xm)+gi(x1, . . . , xi−1, x, xi+1, . . . , xm),
(1.1)
where (gi)1≤i≤m represents the individual penalty of player i depending on the strategies of all
players and f is a convex penalty which is common to all players and models the collective
discomfort of the group. At this level of generality, no reliable method exists for solving (1.1)
and some hypotheses are required. In this paper we focus on the following setting.
Problem 1.1 Let m ≥ 2 be an integer and let f : H1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Hm → ]−∞,+∞] be
a proper lower semicontinuous convex function. For every i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, let gi : H1 ⊕
· · · ⊕ Hm → ]−∞,+∞] be such that, for every (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ H1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Hm, the func-
tion x 7→ gi(x1, . . . , xi−1, x, xi+1, . . . , xm) is convex and differentiable on Hi, and denote by
∇i gi(x1, . . . , xm) its derivative at xi. Moreover,(
∀(x1, . . . , xm) ∈ H1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Hm
)(
∀(y1, . . . , ym) ∈ H1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Hm
)
m∑
i=1
〈∇i gi(x1, . . . , xm)−∇i gi(y1, . . . , ym) | xi − yi〉 ≥ 0. (1.2)
The problem is to find x1 ∈ H1, . . . , xm ∈ Hm such that

x1 ∈ Argmin
x∈H1
f(x, x2, . . . , xm) + g1(x, x2, . . . , xm)
...
xm ∈ Argmin
x∈Hm
f(x1, . . . , xm−1, x) + gm(x1, . . . , xm−1, x).
(1.3)
In the special case when, for every i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, gi = g, Problem 1.1 amounts to finding
a Nash equilibrium of a potential game, i.e., a game in which the penalty of player i can be
represented by a common potential f + g [13]. Hence, Nash equilibria can be found by solving
minimize
x1∈H1,...,xm∈Hm
f(x1, . . . , xm) + g(x1, . . . , xm). (1.4)
Thus, the problem reduces to the minimization of the sum of two convex functions on the Hilbert
space H1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Hm and various methods are available to tackle it under suitable assumptions
(see for instance [5, Chapter 27]). In this paper we address the more challenging non-potential
setting, in which the functions (gi)1≤i≤m need not be identical nor convex, but they must satisfy
(1.2). Let us note that (1.2) actually implies the convexity of gi with respect to its ith variable.
Our methodology consists in using monotone operator splitting techniques for solving an
auxiliary monotone inclusion, the solutions of which are Nash equilibria of Problem 1.1. In
Section 2 we review the notation and background material needed subsequently. In Section 3
we introduce the auxiliary monotone inclusion problem and provide conditions ensuring the
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existence of solutions to the auxiliary problem. We also propose two methods for solving Prob-
lem 1.1 and establish their convergence. Finally, in Section 4 the proposed methods are applied
to the construction of generalized Nash equilibria, to zero-sum games, and to cyclic proximation
problems.
2 Notation and background
Throughout this paper, H, G, and (Hi)1≤i≤m are real Hilbert spaces. For convenience, their
scalar products are all denoted by 〈· | ·〉 and the associated norms by ‖ · ‖. Let A : H → 2H
be a set-valued operator. The domain of A is domA =
{
x ∈ H
∣∣ Ax 6= ∅}, the set of zeros
of A is zerA =
{
x ∈ H
∣∣ 0 ∈ Ax}, the graph of A is graA = {(x, u) ∈ H ×H ∣∣ u ∈ Ax}, the
range of A is ranA =
{
u ∈ H
∣∣ (∃x ∈ H) u ∈ Ax}, the inverse of A is the set-valued operator
A−1 : H → 2H : u 7→
{
x ∈ H
∣∣ u ∈ Ax}, and the resolvent of A is JA = (Id +A)−1. In addition,
A is monotone if
(∀(x, y) ∈ H ×H)(∀(u, v) ∈ Ax×Ay) 〈x− y | u− v〉 ≥ 0 (2.1)
and it is maximally monotone if, furthermore, every monotone operator B : H → 2H such that
graA ⊂ graB coincides with A.
We denote by Γ0(H) the class of lower semicontinuous convex functions ϕ : H → ]−∞,+∞]
which are proper in the sense that domϕ =
{
x ∈ H
∣∣ ϕ(x) < +∞} 6= ∅. Let ϕ ∈ Γ0(H). The
proximity operator of ϕ is
proxϕ : H → H : x 7→ argmin
y∈H
ϕ(y) +
1
2
‖x− y‖2 (2.2)
and the subdifferential of ϕ is the maximally monotone operator
∂ϕ : H → 2H : x 7→
{
u ∈ H
∣∣ (∀y ∈ H) 〈y − x | u〉+ ϕ(x) ≤ ϕ(y)}. (2.3)
We have
Argmin
x∈H
ϕ(x) = zer ∂ϕ and proxϕ = J∂ϕ. (2.4)
Let β ∈ ]0,+∞[. An operator T : H → H is β-cocoercive (or βT is firmly nonexpansive) if
(∀x ∈ H)(∀y ∈ H) 〈x− y | Tx− Ty〉 ≥ β‖Tx− Ty‖2, (2.5)
which implies that it is monotone and β−1–Lipschitzian. Let C be a nonempty convex subset
of H. The indicator function of C is
ιC : H → ]−∞,+∞] : x 7→
{
0, if x ∈ C;
+∞, if x /∈ C
(2.6)
and ∂ιC = NC is the normal cone operator of C, i.e.,
NC : H → 2
H : x 7→
{{
u ∈ H
∣∣ (∀y ∈ C) 〈y − x | u〉 ≤ 0}, if x ∈ C;
∅, otherwise.
(2.7)
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If C is closed, for every x ∈ H, there exists a unique point PCx ∈ C such that ‖x − PCx‖ =
infy∈C ‖x− y‖; PCx is called the projection of x onto C and we have PC = proxιC . In addition,
the symbols ⇀ and→ denote respectively weak and strong convergence. For a detailed account
of the tools described above, see [5].
3 Model, algorithms, and convergence
We investigate an auxiliary monotone inclusion problem the solutions of which are Nash equi-
libria of Problem 1.1 and propose two splitting methods to solve it. Both involve the proximity
operator proxf , which can be computed explicitly in several instances [5, 7]. We henceforth de-
note by H the direct sum of the Hilbert spaces (Hi)1≤i≤m, i.e., the product space H1×· · ·×Hm
equipped with the scalar product
〈〈· | ·〉〉 :
(
(xi)1≤i≤m, (yi)1≤i≤m
)
7→
m∑
i=1
〈xi | yi〉. (3.1)
We denote the associated norm by ||| · |||, a generic element of H by x = (xi)1≤i≤m, and the
identity operator on H by Id .
3.1 A monotone inclusion model
With the notation and hypotheses of Problem 1.1, let us set
A = ∂f and B : H→H : x 7→
(
∇1 g1(x), . . . ,∇m gm(x)
)
. (3.2)
We consider the inclusion problem
find x ∈ zer(A+B). (3.3)
Since f ∈ Γ0(H), A is maximally monotone. On the other hand, it follows from (1.2) that
B is monotone. The following result establishes a connection between the monotone inclusion
problem (3.3) and Problem 1.1.
Proposition 3.1 Using the notation and hypotheses of Problem 1.1, let A and B be as in (3.2).
Then every point in zer(A+B) is a solution to Problem 1.1.
Proof. Suppose that zer(A + B) 6= ∅ and let (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ H. Then [5, Proposition 16.6]
asserts that
A(x1, . . . , xm) ⊂ ∂
(
f(·, x2, . . . , xm)
)
(x1)× · · · × ∂
(
f(x1, . . . , xm−1, ·)
)
(xm). (3.4)
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Hence, since dom g1(·, x2, . . . , xm) = H1, . . . , domgm(x1, . . . , xm−1, ·) = Hm, we derive from
(3.2), (2.4), and [5, Corollary 16.38(iii)] that
(x1, . . . , xm) ∈ zer(A+B) ⇔ −B(x1, . . . , xm) ∈ A(x1, . . . , xm)
⇒


−∇1 g1(x1, . . . , xm) ∈ ∂
(
f(·, x2, . . . , xm)
)
(x1)
...
−∇m gm(x1, . . . , xm) ∈ ∂
(
f(x1, . . . , xm−1, ·)
)
(xm)
⇔ (x1, . . . , xm) solves Problem 1.1, (3.5)
which yields the result.
Proposition 3.1 asserts that we can solve Problem 1.1 by solving (3.3), provided the latter
has solutions. The following result provides instances in which this property is satisfied. First,
we need the following definitions (see [5, Chapters 21–24]).
Let A : H → 2H be monotone. Then A is 3∗ monotone if domA× ranA ⊂ domFA, where
FA : H×H → ]−∞,+∞] : (x, u) 7→ 〈x | u〉 − inf
(y,v)∈graA
〈x− y | u− v〉. (3.6)
On the other hand, A is uniformly monotone if there exists an increasing function φ : [0,+∞[→
[0,+∞] vanishing only at 0 such that(
∀(x, y) ∈ H×H
)(
∀(u, v) ∈ Ax×Ay
)
〈x− y | u− v〉 ≥ φ(‖x− y‖). (3.7)
A function ϕ ∈ Γ0(H) is uniformly convex if there exists an increasing function φ : [0,+∞[ →
[0,+∞] vanishing only at 0 such that
(∀(x, y) ∈ domϕ× domϕ)(∀α ∈ ]0, 1[)
ϕ(αx + (1− α)y) + α(1− α)φ(‖x − y‖) ≤ αϕ(x) + (1− α)ϕ(y). (3.8)
The function φ in (3.7) and (3.8) is called the modulus of uniform monotonicity and of uniform
convexity, respectively, and it is said to be supercoercive if limt→+∞ φ(t)/t = +∞.
Proposition 3.2 With the notation and hypotheses of Problem 1.1, let B be as in (3.2). Sup-
pose that B is maximally monotone and that one of the following holds.
(i) lim|||x|||→+∞ inf |||∂f(x) +Bx||| = +∞.
(ii) ∂f +B is uniformly monotone with a supercoercive modulus.
(iii) (dom ∂f) ∩ domB is bounded.
(iv) f = ιC , where C is a nonempty closed convex bounded subset of H.
(v) f is uniformly convex with a supercoercive modulus.
(vi) B is 3∗ monotone, and ∂f or B is surjective.
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(vii) B is uniformly monotone with a supercoercive modulus.
(viii) B is linear and bounded, there exists β ∈ ]0,+∞[ such that B is β–cocoercive, and ∂f or
B is surjective.
Then zer(∂f +B) 6= ∅. In addition, if (ii), (v), or (vii) holds, zer(∂f +B) is a singleton.
Proof. First note that, for every x = (xi)1≤i≤m ∈ H, dom∇1 g1(·, x2, . . . , xm) = H1, . . . ,
dom∇m gm(x1, . . . , xm−1, ·) = Hm. Hence, it follows from (3.2) that domB = H and, therefore,
from [5, Corollary 24.4(i)] that ∂f +B is maximally monotone. In addition, it follows from [5,
Example 24.9] that ∂f is 3∗ monotone.
(i): This follows from [5, Corollary 21.20]. (ii): This follows from [5, Corollary 23.37(i)].
(iii): Since dom(∂f+B) = (dom ∂f)∩domB, the result follows from [5, Proposition 23.36(iii)].
(iv)⇒(iii): f = ιC ∈ Γ0(H) and dom ∂f = C is bounded. (v)⇒(ii): It follows from (3.2) and
[5, Example 22.3(iii)] that ∂f is uniformly monotone. Hence, ∂f +B is uniformly monotone.
(vi): This follows from [5, Corollary 24.22(ii)]. (vii)⇒(ii): Clear. (viii)⇒(vi): This follows from
[5, Proposition 24.12].
3.2 Forward-backward-forward algorithm
Our first method for solving Problem 1.1 derives from an algorithm proposed in [6], which is
itself a variant of a method proposed in [15].
Theorem 3.3 In Problem 1.1, suppose that there exist (z1, . . . , zm) ∈H such that
−
(
∇1 g1(z1, . . . , zm), . . . ,∇m gm(z1, . . . , zm)
)
∈ ∂f(z1, . . . , zm) (3.9)
and χ ∈ ]0,+∞[ such that
(∀(x1, . . . , xm) ∈H)(∀(y1, . . . , ym) ∈H)
m∑
i=1
‖∇i gi(x1, . . . , xm)−∇i gi(y1, . . . , ym)‖
2 ≤ χ2
m∑
i=1
‖xi − yi‖
2. (3.10)
Let ε ∈ ]0, 1/(χ + 1)[ and let (γn)n∈N be a sequence in [ε, (1 − ε)/χ]. Moreover, for every i ∈
{1, . . . ,m}, let xi,0 ∈ Hi, and let (ai,n)n∈N, (bi,n)n∈N, and (ci,n)n∈N be absolutely summable
sequences in Hi. Now consider the following routine.
(∀n ∈ N)

For i = 1, . . . ,m
⌊ yi,n = xi,n − γn(∇i gi(x1,n, . . . , xm,n) + ai,n)
(p1,n, . . . , pm,n) = proxγnf (y1,n, . . . , ym,n) + (b1,n, . . . , bm,n)
For i = 1, . . . ,m⌊
qi,n = pi,n − γn(∇i gi(p1,n, . . . , pm,n) + ci,n)
xi,n+1 = xi,n − yi,n + qi,n.
(3.11)
Then there exists a solution (x1, . . . , xm) to Problem 1.1 such that, for every i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
xi,n ⇀ xi and pi,n ⇀ xi.
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Proof. Let A and B be defined as (3.2). Then (3.9) yields zer(A + B) 6= ∅ and, for every
γ ∈ ]0,+∞[, (2.4) yields JγA = proxγf . In addition, we deduce from (1.2) and (3.10) that B is
monotone and χ–Lipschitzian. Now set
(∀n ∈ N)


xn = (x1,n, . . . , xm,n)
yn = (y1,n, . . . , ym,n)
pn = (p1,n, . . . , pm,n)
qn = (q1,n, . . . , qm,n)
and


an = (a1,n, . . . , am,n)
bn = (b1,n, . . . , bm,n)
cn = (c1,n, . . . , cm,n).
(3.12)
Then (3.11) is equivalent to
(∀n ∈ N)

yn = xn − γn(Bxn + an)
pn = JγnAyn + bn
qn = pn − γn(Bpn + cn)
xn+1 = xn − yn + qn.
(3.13)
Therefore, the result follows from [6, Theorem 2.5(ii)] and Proposition 3.1.
Note that two (forward) gradient steps involving the individual penalties (gi)1≤i≤m and
one (backward) proximal step involving the common penalty f are required at each iteration of
(3.11).
3.3 Forward-backward algorithm
Our second method for solving Problem 1.1 is somewhat simpler than (3.11) but requires stronger
hypotheses on (gi)1≤i≤m. This method is an application of the forward-backward splitting
algorithm (see [3, 8] and the references therein for background).
Theorem 3.4 In Problem 1.1, suppose that there exist (z1, . . . , zm) ∈H such that
−
(
∇1 g1(z1, . . . , zm), . . . ,∇m gm(z1, . . . , zm)
)
∈ ∂f(z1, . . . , zm) (3.14)
and χ ∈ ]0,+∞[ such that
(∀(x1, . . . , xm) ∈H)(∀(y1, . . . , ym) ∈H)
m∑
i=1
〈∇i gi(x1, . . . , xm)−∇i gi(y1, . . . , ym) | xi − yi〉
≥
1
χ
m∑
i=1
‖∇i gi(x1, . . . , xm)−∇i gi(y1, . . . , ym)‖
2. (3.15)
Let ε ∈ ]0, 2/(χ + 1)[ and let (γn)n∈N be a sequence in [ε, (2 − ε)/χ]. Moreover, for every
i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, let xi,0 ∈ Hi, and let (ai,n)n∈N and (bi,n)n∈N be absolutely summable sequences
in Hi. Now consider the following routine.
(∀n ∈ N)

For i = 1, . . . ,m
⌊ yi,n = xi,n − γn(∇i gi(x1,n, . . . , xm,n) + ai,n)
(x1,n+1, . . . , xm,n+1) = proxγnf (y1,n, . . . , ym,n) + (b1,n, . . . , bm,n).
(3.16)
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Then there exists a solution (x1, . . . , xm) to Problem 1.1 such that, for every i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
xi,n ⇀ xi and ∇i gi(x1,n, . . . , xm,n)→ ∇i gi(x1, . . . , xm).
Proof. If we define A and B as in (3.2), (3.14) is equivalent to zer(A+B) 6= ∅, and it follows
from (3.15) that B is χ−1–cocoercive. Moreover, (3.16) can be recast as
(∀n ∈ N)
⌊
yn = xn − γn(Bxn + an)
xn+1 = JγnAyn + bn.
(3.17)
The result hence follows from Proposition 3.1 and [3, Theorem 2.8(i)&(ii)].
Theorem 3.4 imposes more restrictions on (gi)1≤i≤m. However, unlike the forward-
backward-forward algorithm used in Section 3.2, it employs only one forward step at each iter-
ation. In addition, this method allows for larger gradient steps since the sequence (γn)n∈N lies
in ]0, 2/χ[, as opposed to ]0, 1/χ[ in Theorem 3.3.
4 Applications
The previous results can be used to solve a wide variety of instances of Problem 1.1. We discuss
three examples.
4.1 Saddle functions and zero-sum games
We consider an instance of Problem 1.1 with m = 2 players whose individual penalties g1 and
g2 are saddle functions.
Example 4.1 Let χ ∈ ]0,+∞[, let f ∈ Γ0(H1⊕H2), and let L : H1⊕H2 → R be a differentiable
function with a χ–Lipschitzian gradient such that, for every x1 ∈ H1, L(x1, ·) is concave and,
for every x2 ∈ H2, L(·, x2) is convex. The problem is to find x1 ∈ H1 and x2 ∈ H2 such that

x1 ∈ Argmin
x∈H1
f(x, x2) +L(x, x2)
x2 ∈ Argmin
x∈H2
f(x1, x)−L(x1, x).
(4.1)
Proposition 4.2 In Example 4.1, suppose that there exists (z1, z2) ∈ H1 ⊕H2 such that(
−∇1 L(z1, z2),∇2 L(z1, z2)
)
∈ ∂f(z1, z2). (4.2)
Let ε ∈ ]0, 1/(χ + 1)[ and let (γn)n∈N be a sequence in [ε, (1− ε)/χ]. Moreover, let (x1,0, x2,0) ∈
H1 ⊕ H2, let (a1,n)n∈N, (b1,n)n∈N, and (c1,n)n∈N be absolutely summable sequences in H1, and
let (a2,n)n∈N, (b2,n)n∈N, and (c2,n)n∈N be absolutely summable sequences in H2. Now consider
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the following routine.
(∀n ∈ N)

y1,n = x1,n − γn(∇1 L(x1,n, x2,n) + a1,n)
y2,n = x2,n + γn(∇2 L(x1,n, x2,n) + a2,n)
(p1,n, p2,n) = proxγnf (y1,n, y2,n) + (b1,n, b2,n)
q1,n = p1,n − γn(∇1 L(p1,n, p2,n) + c1,n)
q2,n = p2,n + γn(∇2 L(p1,n, p2,n) + c2,n)
x1,n+1 = x1,n − y1,n + q1,n
x2,n+1 = x2,n − y2,n + q2,n.
(4.3)
Then there exists a solution (x1, x1) to Example 4.1 such that x1,n ⇀ x1, p1,n ⇀ x1, x2,n ⇀ x2,
and p2,n ⇀ x2.
Proof. Example 4.1 corresponds to the particular instance of Problem 1.1 in which m = 2,
g1 = L, and g2 = −L. Indeed, it follows from [14, Theorem 1] that the operator
(x1, x2) 7→
(
∇1L(x1, x2),−∇2 L(x1, x2)
)
(4.4)
is monotone in H1 ⊕ H2 and hence (1.2) holds. In addition, (4.2) implies (3.9) and, since ∇L
is χ–Lipschitzian, (3.10) holds. Altogether, since (3.11) reduces to (4.3), the result follows from
Theorem 3.3.
Next, we examine an application of Proposition 4.2 to 2-player finite zero-sum games.
Example 4.3 We consider a 2-player finite zero-sum game (for complements and background
on finite games, see [16]). Let S1 be the finite set of pure strategies of player 1, with cardinality
N1, and let
C1 =
{
(ξj)1≤j≤N1 ∈ [0, 1]
N1
∣∣∣∣
N1∑
j=1
ξj = 1
}
(4.5)
be his set of mixed strategies (S2, N2, and C2 are defined likewise). Moreover, let L be an
N1 ×N2 real cost matrix such that
(∃ z1 ∈ C1)(∃ z2 ∈ C2) − Lz2 ∈ NC1z1 and L
⊤z1 ∈ NC2z2. (4.6)
The problem is to
find x1 ∈ R
N1 and x2 ∈ R
N2 such that


x1 ∈ Argmin
x∈C1
x⊤Lx2
x2 ∈ Argmax
x∈C2
x⊤1 Lx.
(4.7)
Since the penalty function of player 1 is (x1, x2) 7→ x
⊤
1 Lx2 and the penalty function of player
2 is (x1, x2) 7→ −x
⊤
1 Lx2, (4.7) is a zero-sum game. It corresponds to the particular instance of
Example 4.1 in which H1 = R
N1 , H2 = R
N2 , f : (x1, x2) 7→ ιC1(x1)+ ιC2(x2), and L : (x1, x2) 7→
x⊤1 Lx2. Indeed, since C1 and C2 are nonempty closed convex sets, f ∈ Γ0(H1⊕H2). Moreover,
x1 7→ L(x1, x2) and x2 7→ −L(x1, x2) are convex, and ∇L : (x1, x2) 7→ (Lx2, L
⊤x1) is linear
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and bounded, with ‖∇L‖ = ‖L‖. In addition, for every γ ∈ ]0,+∞[, proxγf = (PC1 , PC2) [5,
Proposition 23.30]. Hence, (4.3) reduces to (we set the error terms to zero for simplicity)
(∀n ∈ N)

y1,n = x1,n − γnLx2,n
y2,n = x2,n + γnL
⊤x1,n
p1,n = PC1y1,n
p2,n = PC2y2,n
q1,n = p1,n − γnLp2,n
q2,n = p2,n + γnL
⊤p1,n
x1,n+1 = x1,n − y1,n + q1,n
x2,n+1 = x2,n − y2,n + q2,n,
(4.8)
where (γn)n∈N is a sequence in [ε, (1 − ε)/‖L‖] for some arbitrary ε ∈ ]0, 1/(‖L‖ + 1)[. Since
∂f : (x1, x2) 7→ NC1x1 × NC2x2, (4.6) yields (4.2). Altogether, Proposition 4.2 asserts that the
sequences (x1,n)n∈N and (x2,n)n∈N generated by (4.8) converge to x1 ∈ R
N1 and x2 ∈ R
N2 ,
respectively, such that (x1, x2) is a solution to (4.7).
4.2 Generalized Nash equilibria
We consider the particular case of Problem 1.1 in which f is the indicator function of a closed
convex subset of H = H1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Hm.
Example 4.4 Let C ⊂ H be a nonempty closed convex set and, for every i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
let gi : H → ]−∞,+∞] be a function which is differentiable with respect to its ith variable.
Suppose that
(
∀(x1, . . . , xm) ∈H
)(
∀(y1, . . . , ym) ∈H
)
m∑
i=1
〈∇i gi(x1, . . . , xm)−∇i gi(y1, . . . , ym) | xi − yi〉 ≥ 0 (4.9)
and set
(∀(x1, . . . , xm) ∈H)


Q1(x2, . . . , xm) =
{
x ∈ H1
∣∣ (x, x2, . . . , xm) ∈ C}
...
Qm(x1, . . . , xm−1) =
{
x ∈ Hm
∣∣ (x1, . . . , xm−1, x) ∈ C}.
(4.10)
The problem is to find x1 ∈ H1, . . . , xm ∈ Hm such that

x1 ∈ Argmin
x∈Q
1
(x2,...,xm)
g1(x, x2, . . . , xm)
...
xm ∈ Argmin
x∈Qm(x1,...,xm−1)
gm(x1, . . . , xm−1, x).
(4.11)
The solutions to Example 4.4 are called generalized Nash equilibria [10], social equilibria
[9], or equilibria of abstract economies [1], and their existence has been studied in [1, 9]. We
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deduce from Proposition 3.1 that we can find a solution to Example 4.4 by solving a varia-
tional inequality in H, provided the latter has solutions. This observation is also made in [10],
which investigates a Euclidean setting in which additional smoothness properties are imposed on
(gi)1≤i≤m. An alternative approach for solving Example 4.4 in Euclidean spaces is also proposed
in [12] with stronger differentiability properties on (gi)1≤i≤m and a monotonicity assumption of
the form (4.9). However, the convergence of the method is not guaranteed. Below we derive
from Section 3.2 a weakly convergent method for solving Example 4.4.
Proposition 4.5 In Example 4.4, suppose that there exist (z1, . . . , zm) ∈H such that
−
(
∇1 g1(z1, . . . , zm), . . . ,∇m gm(z1, . . . , zm)
)
∈ NC(z1, . . . , zm) (4.12)
and χ ∈ ]0,+∞[ such that
(∀(x1, . . . , xm) ∈H)(∀(y1, . . . , ym) ∈H)
m∑
i=1
‖∇i gi(x1, . . . , xm)−∇i gi(y1, . . . , ym)‖
2 ≤ χ2
m∑
i=1
‖xi − yi‖
2. (4.13)
Let ε ∈ ]0, 1/(χ + 1)[ and let (γn)n∈N be a sequence in [ε, (1 − ε)/χ]. Moreover, for every i ∈
{1, . . . ,m}, let xi,0 ∈ Hi, and let (ai,n)n∈N, (bi,n)n∈N, and (ci,n)n∈N be absolutely summable
sequences in Hi. Now consider the following routine.
(∀n ∈ N)

For i = 1, . . . ,m
⌊ yi,n = xi,n − γn(∇i gi(x1,n, . . . , xm,n) + ai,n)
(p1,n, . . . , pm,n) = PC(y1,n, . . . , ym,n) + (b1,n, . . . , bm,n)
For i = 1, . . . ,m⌊
qi,n = pi,n − γn(∇i gi(p1,n, . . . , pm,n) + ci,n)
xi,n+1 = xi,n − yi,n + qi,n.
(4.14)
Then there exists a solution (x1, . . . , xm) to Example 4.4 such that, for every i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
xi,n ⇀ xi and pi,n ⇀ xi.
Proof. Example 4.4 corresponds to the particular instance of Problem 1.1 in which f = ιC .
Hence, since PC = proxf , the result follows from Theorem 3.3.
4.3 Cyclic proximation problem
We consider the following problem in H = H1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Hm.
Example 4.6 Let G be a real Hilbert space, let f ∈ Γ0(H), and, for every i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, let
Li : Hi → G be a bounded linear operator. The problem is to find x1 ∈ H1, . . . , xm ∈ Hm such
that 

x1 ∈ Argmin
x∈H1
f(x, x2, . . . , xm) +
1
2
‖L1x− L2x2‖
2
x2 ∈ Argmin
x∈H2
f(x1, x, . . . , xm) +
1
2
‖L2x− L3x3‖
2
...
xm ∈ Argmin
x∈Hm
f(x1, . . . , xm−1, x) +
1
2
‖Lmx− L1x1‖
2.
(4.15)
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For every i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, the individual penalty function of player i models his desire
to keep some linear transformation Li of his strategy close to some linear transformation of
that of the next player i + 1. In the particular case when f : (xi)1≤i≤m 7→
∑m
i=1 fi(xi), a
similar formulation is studied in [2, Section 3.1], where an algorithm is proposed for solving
(4.15). However, each step of the algorithm involves the proximity operator of a sum of convex
functions, which is extremely difficult to implement numerically. The method described below
circumvents this difficulty.
Proposition 4.7 In Example 4.6, suppose that there exists (z1, . . . , zm) ∈H such that(
L∗1(L2z2 − L1z1), . . . , L
∗
m(L1z1 − Lmzm)
)
∈ ∂f(z1, . . . , zm). (4.16)
Set χ = 2max1≤i≤m ‖Li‖
2, let ε ∈ ]0, 2/(χ + 1)[ and let (γn)n∈N be a sequence in [ε, (2 − ε)/χ].
For every i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, let xi,0 ∈ Hi, and let (ai,n)n∈N and (bi,n)n∈N be absolutely summable
sequences in Hi. Now set Lm+1 = L1, for every n ∈ N, set xm+1,n = x1,n, and consider the
following routine.
(∀n ∈ N)

For i = 1, . . . ,m
⌊ yi,n = xi,n − γn
(
L∗i (Lixi,n − Li+1xi+1,n) + ai,n
)
(x1,n+1, . . . , xm,n+1) = proxγnf (y1,n, . . . , ym,n) + (b1,n, . . . , bm,n).
(4.17)
Then there exists a solution (x1, . . . , xm) to Example 4.6 such that, for every i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
xi,n ⇀ xi and L
∗
i
(
Li(xi,n − xi)− Li+1(xi+1,n − xi+1)
)
→ 0.
Proof. Note that Example 4.6 corresponds to the particular instance of Problem 1.1 in which, for
every i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, gi : (xi)1≤i≤m 7→ ‖Lixi − Li+1xi+1‖/2, where we set xm+1 = x1. Indeed,
since
(∀(x1, . . . , xm) ∈H)


∇1 g1(x1, . . . , xm) = L
∗
1(L1x1 − L2x2)
...
∇m gm(x1, . . . , xm) = L
∗
m(Lmxm − L1x1),
(4.18)
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the operator (xi)1≤i≤m 7→ (∇i gi(x1, . . . , xm))1≤i≤m is linear and bounded. Thus, for every
(x1, . . . , xm) ∈H,
m∑
i=1
〈∇i gi(x1, . . . , xm) | xi〉 =
m∑
i=1
〈L∗i (Lixi − Li+1xi+1) | xi〉
=
m∑
i=1
〈Lixi − Li+1xi+1 | Lixi〉
=
m∑
i=1
‖Lixi‖
2 −
m∑
i=1
〈Li+1xi+1 | Lixi〉
=
1
2
m∑
i=1
‖Lixi‖
2 +
1
2
m∑
i=1
‖Li+1xi+1‖
2 −
m∑
i=1
〈Li+1xi+1 | Lixi〉
=
m∑
i=1
1
2
‖Lixi − Li+1xi+1‖
2
=
m∑
i=1
1
2‖Li‖2
‖Li‖
2‖Lixi − Li+1xi+1‖
2
≥ χ−1
m∑
i=1
‖L∗i (Lixi − Li+1xi+1)‖
2
= χ−1
m∑
i=1
‖∇i gi(x1, . . . , xm)‖
2, (4.19)
and hence (3.15) and (1.2) hold. In addition, (4.16) yields (3.14). Altogether, since (3.16)
reduces to (4.17), the result follows from Theorem 3.4.
We present below an application of Proposition 4.7 to cyclic proximation problems and,
in particular, to cyclic projection problems.
Example 4.8 We apply Example 4.6 to cyclic evaluations of proximity operators. For every
i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, let Hi = H, let fi ∈ Γ0(H), let Li = Id , and set f : (xi)1≤i≤m 7→
∑m
i=1 fi(xi). In
view of (2.2), Example 4.6 reduces to finding x1 ∈ H, . . . , xm ∈ H such that

x1 = proxf1 x2
x2 = proxf2 x3
...
xm = proxfm x1.
(4.20)
It is assumed that (4.20) has at least one solution. Since proxf : (xi)1≤i≤m 7→ (proxfi xi)1≤i≤m
[5, Proposition 23.30], (4.17) becomes (we set errors to zero for simplicity)
(∀n ∈ N)
⌊
For i = 1, . . . ,m
⌊ xi,n+1 = proxγnfi((1 − γn)xi,n + γnxi+1,n),
(4.21)
where (xi,0)1≤i≤m ∈ H
m and (γn)n∈N is a sequence in [ε, 1− ε] for some arbitrary ε ∈ ]0, 1/2[.
Proposition 4.7 asserts that the sequences (x1,n)n∈N, . . . , (xm,n)n∈N generated by (4.21) converge
weakly to points x1 ∈ H, . . . , xm ∈ H, respectively, such that (x1, . . . , xm) is a solution to (4.20).
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In the particular case when, for every i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, fi = ιCi , a solution of (4.20)
represents a cycle of points in C1, . . . , Cm. It can be interpreted as a Nash equilibrium of the
game in which, for every i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, the strategies of player i, belong to Ci and its penalty
function is (xi)1≤i≤m 7→ ‖xi−xi+1‖
2, that is, player i wants to have strategies as close as possible
to the strategies of player i + 1. Such schemes go back at least to [11]. It has recently been
proved [4] that, in this case, if m > 2, the cycles are not minimizers of any potential, from which
we infer that this problem cannot be reduced to a potential game. Note that (4.21) becomes
(∀n ∈ N)
⌊
For i = 1, . . . ,m
⌊ xi,n+1 = PCi((1 − γn)xi,n + γnxi+1,n)
(4.22)
and the sequences thus generated (x1,n)n∈N, . . . , (xm,n)n∈N converge weakly to points x1 ∈
H, . . . , xm ∈ H, respectively, such that (x1, . . . , xm) is a cycle. The existence of cycles has
been proved in [11] when one of the sets C1, . . . , Cm is bounded. Thus, (4.22) is an alternative
parallel algorithm to the method of successive projections [11].
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